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In this paper we propose the usage of a hybrid of techniques as complementary tools in decision analysis 
for learning from failures and the reason behind systems failure. We demonstrate the applicability of 
these tools through an aviation case study, where an accident investigation report was obtained from 
the Directorate of Accident Investigation in the Ministry of Transport and Communications in Botswana 
to provide as a basis for the application of the model. The report included all the factual information 
required to carry out the investigation using the hybrid of FTA, RBD, AHP, HoQ and the DMG tools. 
We discuss the steps followed in applying the tools in the process of learning from failure. It also shows 
the importance of such tools in accident investigations by showing the importance of prioritising the 
available options in order of their importance to the accident under investigation. 
Most of the available research in learning from failure focuses mostly on the direct causal factors of the 
failure event. Here we provide a holistic approach to learning from failure by focusing on both direct and 
indirect causes of a failure event through the use of Reliability Engineering tools, Multi Criteria Decision 
Making tools and House of Quality. 
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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o  1. Introduction 
In many organisations failure is always the cause of conﬂicts as
they have inherited a blame and lack of trust culture ( Cox, Jones,
& Collinson, 2006 ; and Jefcott, Pidgeon, Weyman, & Walls, 2006 ).
Even though this is the case, some organisations view failure as an
opportunity to obtain lessons for continual improvement hence a
chance of gaining competitive advantage over their nearest rivals. 
Failure can be deﬁned in many different ways of which the
use is inﬂuenced by the context it is used on. Torell and Ave-
lar (2010) described failure in two distinct ways as the inability
of a product or system to perform its required function and also
as the inability of a component to perform its required function
without hindering the function of the product as a whole. 
The ability to learn from failures helps organizations, engineers
and designers to put in place measures to avert the same inade-
quacies from re-occurring. Labib (2015) explains that for clear un-
derstanding of the causes of a failure, there is a major need to
analyse four factors, which are; human, design, organizational andsocio-cultural factors. 
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0957-4174/© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article uBy doing so Labib and Read (2015) suggested that four main
eneﬁts could be obtained that include easy identiﬁcation of root
auses of the failure and the associated reasons. The other beneﬁt
s that such analysis of failure can help to institute long term plans
o prevent similar events from re-occurring and can also act as an
arly warning signal just prior to the event in order for defensive
ctions to be taken. They also suggested that it helps decision mak-
rs with information on priorities for resource allocation for both
ecovery and prevention. 
Labib and Read (2015) proposed categorising of causal factors
s either direct cause or contributing factors when dealing with
atural disasters. This approach can also be useful when dealing
ith failures associated with multi-disciplinary environments such
s in aviation where there is an interaction of many specialties
uch as operations, maintenance, air traﬃc control, meteorology,
irport services, ﬁre ﬁghting etc. 
When dealing with failure engineers tend to tackle only the di-
ect causes of a failure event hence putting less or almost no effort
n averting indirect causes of a failure incident. As a result these
ndirect causes remain unsolved hence continuing hidden in the
ystem, with a chance of causing further failure in the future. 
It is the purpose of this paper to present a hybrid model for
earning from failures where both the direct causes and indirect
auses of failure are investigated. This model utilises the reliabil-
ty engineering tools of Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Reliability Blocknder the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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m  iagrams (RBD) and Fault Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis
FMECA); Multi-criteria Decision Analysis techniques of Analytic
ierarchical Process (AHP) and Decision Making Grid (DMG); and
ouse of Quality (HoQ). To explain the usefulness and application
f the model a case study is used. 
The next section provides a detailed literature review on how
ifferent researchers use the above-mentioned technique to learn
rom failure. This is followed by a brief summary of the failure
vent that will be used as the case study for the application of
he proposed model with the subsequent section focusing on the
ramework itself and its application on the case study. Finally sec-
ion ﬁve gives the conclusion of the report underlining the weak-
ess and the strength of the proposed approach. 
. Theoretical frameworks 
There is a number of research work carried out by scholars and
ndustry experts in order to come up with models of learning from
ailures. These literature works act as a starting point for further
esearch in this important area and also as a guide for the model
roposed in this paper. 
Classiﬁcation of hybrid models and modelling of operational re-
earch tools can be traced back to the work of Shanthikumar and
argent (1983) , who suggested that hybrid approaches can man-
fest itself in two ways; either through the models and their so-
ution procedures, or through the use of the solution procedure
f independent types of models. The former option they called it
hybrid model’, whereas the latter they termed it as ‘hybrid mod-
lling’. In our approach we will focus on the former option where
n output of one type of modelling can be an input to the other.
n terms of types and usage of operational research (OR) models,
hanthikumar and Sargent (1983) suggested that modelling is used
n ﬁve ways (i) in analysis, where modelling is used to obtain an
utput for a given system and input, (ii) in optimization, where
he model and its solution procedure are used to ﬁnd the values
f the decision variables to optimize an objective function, (iii) in
ynthesis, where a model is developed to convert a set of inputs
nto a set of desired outputs, (iv) in gaining insight into a system’s
ehaviour by developing a model of it and using its solution pro-
edure to explore its behaviour, and (v) in the comparison of alter-
ative systems, where modelling of various alternative systems are
arried out to determine the "best" one. In our work we are inter-
sted here in two types of synthesis, and gaining insight through
earning lessons from failures. 
Morgan, Belton, and Howick (2016) and Morgan, Howick, & Bel-
on, 2017 developed a good review about use of hybrid OR tech-
iques, where they concluded that mixing OR modelling meth-
ds raises many philosophical issues and that there are argu-
ents that suggest beneﬁts and potential problems of mixing OR
ethods in general. However, they argue that real-world prob-
em situations are highly complex and multidimensional, and po-
entially may beneﬁt from different paradigms to focus on dif-
erent aspects of a situation. Howick, Ackermann, Walls, Quigley,
nd Houghton (2017) used a case study to illustrate how one can
earn from mixing OR methods and speciﬁcally they focused on the
alue or impact of such integration of methods. However, most of
he survey literature about case studies of mixing methods tend to
e applied to a hybrid f two or maximum three methods, whereas
n our case we develop a framework that utilises multiple methods
nd we highlight the beneﬁt of using each one. 
Love, Lopez, and Edwards (2013 ) developed a learning frame-
ork that can be used to mitigate design errors and potential
ailures and accidents in the construction industry. Their frame-
ork acknowledges the fundamental pathogenic inﬂuences that
ontribute to errors and failures. As such it suggests that a group
f approaches should be implemented simultaneously at a project,rganisational and people level in order to lessen errors and fail-
res. 
Failure to do this, according to Love et al (2013 ) would depend
n time until the next major failure is experienced. They continue
y explaining that reviewing past experiences is the ﬁrst step in
earning from failures but the much bigger step is taking action.
his is because taking action involves a major change in both be-
aviour and culture. 
When analysing the Fukushima accident, Zubair, Park, Heo, Has-
an, and Aamir (2015) noticed that there exist basic precursors
f nuclear accidents that are inherently diﬃcult to quantify with
ague priorities. So, to overcome these shortfalls they proposed
 model, which combined the AHP and the Bayesian Belief Net-
ork (BBN). These helped them to accomplish sensitivity analysis
nd prior probabilities into posterior probabilities of precursors. As
uch they found out that design is the most important precursor
hough the chance of an accident is also dependent on other fac-
ors such as culture and plant speciﬁc conditions, which can af-
ect the distribution of prior probability. For a review of AHP in
erms of its methodological variation, please see Ishizaka and Labib
2011a, b) . 
In their research, Ishizaka and Labib (2014) studied the Bhopal
isaster and proposed a model for learning from failure. In their
odel they demonstrated that the FTA can be improved in Crisis
ree Analysis (CTA) in order to map a crisis with the introduction
f the revolving gate as opposed to the AND and OR gate that are
sed in an FTA. The CTA caters for ampliﬁed impact of the input
vent to the ﬁnal event. 
They also suggested that the RBD could also map crisis with
yper-blocks as the complement of the revolving gate. Their model
lso utilises the AHP method to measure the criticality of the basic
vents. Through the use of their model more realistic and sound
ecisions can be made unlike when using each technique in isola-
ion. 
In a bid to show that the use of FTA and RBD can systematically
elp in solving complex industrial failures, Yunusa-Kaltungo, Ker-
ani, and Labib (2017) applied these techniques to investigate a
hronic rotary kiln refractory brick failure in a fully integrated ce-
ent plant. They compared the eﬃciency of these methods to the
ne that was being used in the plant that is based on Root Cause
nalysis (RCA). The results obtained indicated that the investigative
ethod that was used in the plant that is based on RCA failed to
revent future occurrences. Through the usage of FTA and RBD the
nvestigative team obtained a holistic understanding of the failure
ausing factors and their interrelations hence helping in avoiding
epetition in the future. Both FTA and RBD have been used in a
omplimentary manner ( Bhattacharjya & Deleris, 2012 ). 
Labib (2015) emphasized the importance of the FTA and RBD
echniques in creating a framework for learning from failures. He
sed these techniques to analyse the Bhopal disaster and he con-
luded that they could be used to serve as both knowledge reten-
ion and decision support tools. According to Labib (2015) they can
rovide practitioners with guidelines to follow the root cause of
he problem, equips them with the tool box leading to more ef-
ective decision making practices, process safety and environment
rotection. 
Morgan et al. (2016) presented insights on using hybrid mod-
ls by mixing OR methods of system dynamics and discrete-event
imulation within a real world project. They presented the model
evelopment process, the role of each modelling method and the
eneﬁts of using such hybrid models in project design. In their
ork, they have shown that by using hybrid models in comple-
entary, each model add value to the other resulting in an all-
ound solution to the problem. 
On the other hand, Labib and Read (2015) proposed a hybrid
odel for learning from failure that utilises both the reliability en-
214 C. Stephen, A. Labib / Expert Systems With Applications 93 (2018) 212–222 
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L  gineering tools and the multi criteria decision analysis tools. They
used the reliability tools of FMECA, FTA and RBD in their model.
They used this model to study the Hurricane Katrina disaster. The
FTA is the starting point of their model creating inputs for FMECA
and RBD. The output for the FMECA, FTA and RBD act as inputs
to the MCDA method of AHP which produces the outputs helping
the user to make either selection decisions or resource allocation
decisions. 
All the models proposed in the above studied literature have
been applied on major disasters as such one can wonder if they
can be of ultimate importance in minor failures. They also concen-
trate more on the direct cause of the failure with less emphasis
on indirect factors. These outlines the importance of the proposed
model as it will focus on both direct and indirect causes of a fail-
ure with the use of a case study in which no lives were lost. It
also tries to appreciate the beneﬁts of using hybrid models by us-
ing techniques in complementary. 
3. ZS-CME serious incident 
ZS-CME is a bombardier CRJ-100 series aircraft that is registered
by the South African civil Aviation Authority under the ownership
of CemAir. This aircraft suffered main landing gear wheel disinte-
gration upon landing during its scheduled ﬂight from Cape Town
to Gaborone. 
This incident was investigated as a means to derive lessons and
gather facts as to what happened, how it happened, when it hap-
pened, where and why it happened by the directorate of accident
investigation in the ministry of transport and communications in
Botswana. The purpose of this investigation was to obtain facts in
order to prevent similar incidents from occurring in the future. 
According to ICAO annex 13, aircraft wheel disintegration are
not classiﬁed as accidents but circumstances surrounding the ZS-
CME incident made it to be have classiﬁed as a serious incident
rather than just an incident ( Moakoﬁ, 2016 ). The below sections
give a clear synopsis of what really happened. 
3.1. Synopsis of the incident 
On August 31, 2015 ZS-CME operated by Air Botswana under a
lease agreement on a scheduled service as BOT 332 experienced
starboard outer wheel disintegration upon landing at Sir Seretse
Khama International Airport (SSKIA) in Gaborone. The aircraft de-
parted Cape Town International Airport (CTIA) earlier that day
where it was reported to have experienced excessive vibration dur-
ing the take-off roll but the ﬂight crew misjudged as minor and
continued with the ﬂight. 
Two seconds after touch down it was reported that the crew,
air traﬃc control (ATC) and even the ﬁre ﬁghters heard a loud bang
sound. Even though the crew had no idea what was the problem
they taxied the aircraft for almost 1.3 km in order to clear the run-
way for the service that was landing behind them while increasing
the inherent risk to passengers. All passengers and crew disem-
barked safely as it was noticed the aircraft was tilting to the right
as the wheel has disintegrated destroying the right main landing
gear and ripping off the inner ﬂap hence creating a ﬁre hazard as
the wings contained fuel. 
3.2. Investigation ﬁndings 
The worrying issues were the prolonged period the ﬁre and res-
cue services (FRS) took to heed help to the occupants in the air-
craft and the unavailability of aircraft engineers to attend the in-
cident. These prompted the investigators to dig deep to see what
could have caused this delays and the unavailability of engineers. As a result, they found out that the Public Address (PA) sys-
em that would have made it possible for the ATC to communicate
ffectively with FRS was unserviceable which meant the relay of
nformation from the ATC to the FRS was ineffective as it has to
ass through a third person before the information can reach its
estination. 
The other startling discovery was that since the aircraft was op-
rated by Air Botswana under a lease agreement, CemAir did not
rovide the ground support engineers at the airport even though
he lease agreement stated that, “the lessor shall supply duly qual-
ﬁed ground engineers/technicians who shall be available in the
perations area to carry out daily line maintenance and minor
ngine and airframe inspections on the aircraft as required, as
er included costs” ( Moakoﬁ, 2016 ). It was evident the lessee had
aid for such services because they had no engineers appropriately
rained on the type of the aircraft because they had no such type
n their ﬂeet. It is reported that the maintenance crew arrived
ater on from Johannesburg. 
Since the incident resulted in debris all over the runway it was
lso noticed that the airport had no serviceable runway sweeper
egardless of the threat foreign object debris on the runway pose
o safe air travel. The measures put in place to act as an alternative
re not only time consuming but also ineffective as compared to
he use of a runway sweeper. See Davidson and Labib (2003) on
he impact of debris of rubber from the wheel on the runway of
he Concorde accident. 
The direct causes of the incident upon investigation where
ound to be originated from a major maintenance work that was
arried out some two and half months prior to the incident. It was
vident that during maintenance work there occurred an incorrect
nstallation of brake lines to the inboard/outboard swivel assembly
orts. This would result in a faulty operation of the anti-skid sys-
em producing a pro-skid condition which when activated would
ncrease load on the landing gear instead of reducing it. This cross
iring of brake lines can be attributed to design errors in the air-
raft landing gear system which made it possible. 
Investigators found out that the aircraft manufacturer became
ware of the design error and offered a service bulletin (SB), which
ccording to Moakoﬁ (2016) it was not evident whether the SB
as affected, as the aircraft records from their previous owner, an
merican company, were inadequate to tell. The effective date of
he SB was 26 December 2014 and operators where required to
ave complied within 6600 ﬂying hours from the effective date but
ot later than March 2017. 
Moakoﬁ (2016) also found out that during the take-off roll in
TIA the aircraft experienced severe vibration that could have been
n indication of fault initiation. The crew then decided to continue
ith the ﬂight as they considered the vibration to be minor. Even
hough Moakoﬁ (2016) did not mention anything about the vibra-
ion limits of the aircraft it can be argued that the pilot decision
as informed by what the indicators told them or maybe they
cted in negligence. The indicators might have given them inad-
quate information that could have left the crew indecisive about
hat measure to take. 
. Proposed model 
The proposed model is an extension of the model proposed
y Labib and Read (2015) that encompasses reliability engineering
ools of FTA, FMECA and RBD and the MCDM tool of AHP. As an
xtension to this model the new model will make use of a sim-
liﬁed HoQ matrix and a modiﬁed MCDM technique of DMG. The
verview of the proposed model is shown in Fig. (1) . 
The FMECA tool is not explained in this paper but its ap-
lication in the proposed model is the same as explained in
abib and Read (2015) , and for a review of its variations please see
C. Stephen, A. Labib / Expert Systems With Applications 93 (2018) 212–222 215 
Fig. 1. The model overview and interface of techniques. 
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s  iu, Liu, and Liu (2013) . It is the authors’ view that the use of
MECA will provide risk priority numbers that will show the crit-
cality of the basic events to the AHP. This combat the importance
f other basic events to the failure hence resulting in devising a so-
ution to the critical causal factors only. As a result the events that
re not deemed critical remain unsolved and hidden in the system
esulting in them causing failures in the future. 
In the following, the criteria for application of the proposed
ybrid model for learning from failure are summarised. The de-
ails about each of the tools used are given in the subsequent sub-
ections. 
Step 1 : Develop an FTA for the root causes of the failure event,
expand by mapping the FTA into an RBD and use them to
derive an equivalent RBD model. 
Step 2 : With the information on root causes from the FTA formu-
late a FMECA study. 
Step 3 : Using the risk priority numbers from the FMECA, hier-
archical model from the FTA and information on parallel
and series structures from the RBD, complete the AHP. 
Step 4 : Use causes of failure and ways of eliminating them from
the FMECA, and the relative importance and priority
numbers from the AHP to formulate a House of Quality
matrix. 
Step 5 : Obtain comparison parameters from the AHP model to
create a DMG and use relative importance weights from
the HoQ matrix in case of events belonging to the same
cell of the grid to make decisions on which to prioritise
more within the same cell. 
.1. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and the Reliability Block Diagrams 
RBD) 
The FTA shows how basic events interact leading to the overall
ailure under study. At the top of the FTA is the undesirable failure
hat is under study, which in our case study is the ZS-CME serious
ncident, with different failures connected underneath until the ba-
ic events are reached. Basic events are the root causes of such fail-
res that lead to the overall failure under investigation. The use ofogic AND- and OR- gates show the relationship between the ba-
ic events and the failures. The AND- gate shows that the system
s parallel and the OR-gate indicates series systems. Fig. (2) shows
he FTA for the ZS-CME serious incident. 
It is from the FMECA that we obtain information on failure
odes to be used on the formulation of the FTA. We also ob-
ain information on how basic events are related towards causing
he failure under investigation helping in formulating the reliabil-
ty block diagram of the system. The FTA also shows the hierarchy
f events that took place towards the failure under investigation
ence giving input information for the AHP tool. 
In other words, the hierarchies in both FTA and AHP are al-
eady considering every element (contributing factor). However,
e group these factors under the two categories of direct and in-
irect causes. 
The justiﬁcation for the usage of the two AND- gates that leads
o the ZS-CME serious incident is because the analysis is made af-
er the incident has taken place, which means all the events that
all under those branches had a part to play towards the incident.
he occurrence of either event 1 or event 2 would have resulted in
ailure on the operational side hence the justiﬁcation for the OR-
ate. 
Occurrence of unclear maintenance records had a negative ef-
ect on the maintenance works carried out on the aircraft lead-
ng to maintenance faults. The same applies to the failure by the
ircraft design team to avoid interconnectivity of components in
heir design, an aspect that played a vital role in the occurrence
f the incident. These events on their own would have resulted in
rrors in the maintenance of the aircraft hence the usage of the
R- gate. 
As for the indirect causes of the incident, each event would
ave had an effect without the inﬂuence of another event. This
eans that event 6 would result in the outcome of the incident
ithout event 7 or event 8. The same applies to the two other in-
irect causes hence the reasoning behind the OR- gate. 
The RBD designed from the interdependency information ob-
ained from the FTA is shown in Fig. (3) . It can be noted that
rom this diagram the indirect causes of the incident form a series
ystem, a ﬁnding that should be a main cause for worry. Failure
216 C. Stephen, A. Labib / Expert Systems With Applications 93 (2018) 212–222 
Fig. 2. The Fault Tree analysis (FTA) of the ZS-CME serious incident. 
Fig. 3. The Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) of the ZS-CME serious incident. 
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m  of either event 6, 7 or 8 results in a complete breakdown of the
whole branch of the RBD leaving reliance only on the direct causes
branch. This shows that the indirect causes should never be taken
lightly when analysing such a failure. 
The minimum cut set for this system would be a failure of one
event in the indirect causes branch of the RBD (6, 7 or 8) and fail-
ure of three events from the direct causes. The three events from
the direct causes branch could be event 3 and either event 1 or
event 2 and either event 4 or event 5. Shown below is the deriva-
tion of the minimum cut set of this system. 
Cut set = (6 + 7 + 8). (4 + 5). (3). (1 + 2) which implies that the
minimum cut sets are; t  Minimum cut sets are 1.3.4.6; 1.3.4.7; 1.3.4.8; 1.3.5.6; 1.3.5.7;
.3.5.8; 2.3.4.6; 2.3.4.7; 2.3.4.8; 2.3.5.6; 2.3.5.7 and 2.3.5.8 
From the minimum cut sets we can also notice the importance
f event 3. Its occurrence weakens all other sets. 
.2. Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
The MCDM technique of AHP helps in assessing the relative
eights of multiple options against given criteria in an intuitive
anner ( Parthiban, Zubar, & Garge, 2012 ). From the FTA we get
he hierarchical information to be used on the AHP with the sec-
C. Stephen, A. Labib / Expert Systems With Applications 93 (2018) 212–222 217 
Fig. 4. AHP structure for the direct causes of the ZS-CME serious Incident. 
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(  
l  nd level being the criteria and the basic events being the sub
riteria. 
The alternatives will be other common factors to consider when
rying to solve the basic events and these will include the proba-
ility of re-occurrence when the basic event remains unsolved, the
afety impact (severity) caused by the basic event and the cost in-
urred when trying to devise a solution. These three common fac-
ors are considered as decision variables since any decision taken
ill tend to focus on mitigation against risk in the form of both
robability of re-occurrence and severity, as well as the required
esource allocation in terms of cost incurred. 
Using the AHP, to create the evaluation criteria, basic events are
ompared and given weights that will give the information on their
riorities when trying to put in place measures that will help to
void the similar failure from occurring in the future. This is done
sing the methodology that was explained by Saaty (2008) where
 matrix is formed by comparing each basic event against the other
asic events from the FTA and giving a score between 1 and 9 with
 indicating that the events are equally important and 9 indicating
hat one event is absolutely more important than the other. The
cores depend on the authors’ judgement of the criteria. However
he authors were informed by secondary data based on informa-
ion included in the investigations reports of the accident. 
The formed matrix is then normalised by making the sum of all
alues in a column equal to one. We then get the weight of each
valuation criteria by adding the values in each row and obtaining
he average. To ensure that both the direct causes and the indi-
ect causes of the failure are considered as seen from the RBD they
re both important, two AHP models are created one for the direct
nd the other for the indirect causes. Fig. (4) shows the AHP for
he direct causes of the failure with weights of both criteria and
lternatives indicated. As for indirect causes, the model is shown
n Fig. (5) . 
In order to come up with the weights for alternatives, we create
 matrix by comparing the alternatives (safety impact of the basic,
robability of reoccurrence if it remains unsolved, cost of devising
 solution) to each other with respect to each basic event and give
 score of 1– 9. Then this matrix will undergo a normalisation pro-
ess described above for the evaluation criteria and the average of
alues in a row obtained. 
Finally to obtain the weights of alternatives the matrix of alter-
atives with respect to the basic event is multiplied with the ma-
c  rix of criteria. Table 1 and 2 shows the pairwise comparison of the
ain criteria with respect to the goal and the pairwise comparison
atrix of the alternatives with respect to event 4 respectively. 
In order to explain how the priorities (weights) are derived
nce the comparisons matrices are completed, we use the tradi-
ional AHP eigenvalue method as described in Appendix A . 
From the AHP structure for direct causes we can notice that de-
ising a solution for event 4(design errors) have to be given the
ighest priority followed by event 3, event 5, event 2 and event 1
espectively. Also from the alternatives we can deduce that it is im-
ortant to consider the safety impacts of each criterion before we
an consider the probability of re-occurrence and the cost of devel-
ping a solution. Probability of re-occurrence has a higher priority
han the cost of devising a solution. This information will be very
mportant in the formulation of the modiﬁed decision making grid.
The weakness of the AHP include too much dependency on
udgement of the person who is using it as such it can be subjec-
ive an aspect that can be eliminated by having a group of experts
tating their views on what a score to give to a certain criteria
ith respect to the goal or an alternative with respect to a crite-
ia. The strength includes simplifying of the users decision-making
rocess by expertly comparing criteria with respect to the goal and
lternatives with respect to criteria. 
.3. Simple House of Quality (HoQ) matrix 
According to Kuei (2002) HoQ is a structured and systematic
pproach designed to translate customer needs into appropriate
ompany business objectives. The HoQ matrix is made up of six
ajor sections that show how the customer speciﬁcations are
ranslated into the designer’s language. A full HoQ matrix is shown
n Fig. (6) . 
As shown in Fig. (6) the formulation of a HoQ matrix start with
ustomer requirements being deﬁned and given the relative impor-
ance weights as suggested by the customers, which are the rows,
r the ‘Whats’ (i.e. what the customers wants) in the HoQ matrix).
he next step is to come up with what designers can achieve to
atisfy such requirements, which are the columns, or the ‘Hows’
ie how can the customer requirements be fulﬁlled). This is fol-
owed by the customer’s perception of where the company is as
ompared to competitors. At the centre of the matrix is the inter-
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Fig. 5. AHP structure for the indirect causes of the failure. 
Table 1 
Pairwise comparison of the main criteria with respect to the direct causes of the failure. 
Design errors Unclear maintenance records FOD Pilot indecision Pilot negligence Weights 
Design errors 1 7 3 8 8 0.507 
Unclear maintenance records 1/7 1 1/5 4 3 0.108 
FOD 1/3 5 1 7 6 0.283 
Pilot indecision 1/8 1/4 1/7 1 3 0.063 
Pilot negligence 1/8 1/3 1/6 1/3 1 0.040 
Table 2 
Pairwise comparison of alternatives with respect to Event 4 (design error). 
Safety impact of the event Probability of Re -occurrence if unsolved Cost of devising a solution Weights 
Safety impact of the event 1 5 9 0.723 
Probability of Re -occurrence if unsolved 1 \ 5 1 5 0.216 
Cost of devising a solution 1 \ 9 1 \ 5 1 0.061 
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S  relationship matrix, which shows how the customer needs relate
to the engineering characteristics. 
At the roof of the matrix is a depiction of how the engineer-
ing characteristics affect each other. As such the roof of the matrix
presents an opportunity for engineers to specify the various en-
gineering features that have to be improved collateral ( Hauser &
Clausing, 1988 ). The ﬁnal aspect of the HoQ matrix is the technical
assessment and target for each engineering characteristic for the
betterment of the product. 
Hauser and Clausing (1988) described the HoQ as a kind of con-
ceptual map that provides the means for inter functional planning;
which means it can be used as a diagrammatic representation. It
is as such, that in the proposed model a simple HoQ matrix is
employed in order to provide a visual representation of the causal
factors of the failure and the ways of eliminating or reducing the
severity of such factors. 
The causal factors will occupy the part of the matrix where cus-
tomer needs are deﬁned and the engineering characteristics sec-
tion will be occupied with ways of eliminating the causal factors
to the failure under investigation. The weights obtained for the cri-
teria’s in the AHP will be transferred to the relative importance
section. 
It must be noted that both direct and indirect causes to the fail-
ure are treated as having equal importance as such each have its
section in the matrix. A simpliﬁed HoQ matrix for the failure be-
ing investigated is shown in Fig. (7) . In Fig. (7) , we simply map theWhats’ (rows) in the HoQ model against the ‘Hows’ (columns). Not
hat the ‘Hows’ are potential solutions that in our view can address
ach of the rows in varying degrees as captured by the X’s in the
elationship matrix in the middle of the grid, which is a simpliﬁed
ersion of HoQ model. Note that the top of the matrix was gener-
ted using the information obtained from Moakoﬁ (2016) . 
.4. Decision making grid (DMG) 
The decision making grid is an MCDM technique which pro-
ides means of identifying which maintenance actions are vi-
ble for a system In order to provide optimised balance between
ost and performance risks. Labib developed this concept in 1996
y combining the rule-based approach with the AHP for MCDM
 Labib, Williams, & Connor, 1998 ). 
It acts as a map where using multiple criteria the worst per-
orming machines can be classed ( Labib, 1998 ). This grouping of
achines aid in the implementation of appropriate actions that
ill improve their performance, hence moving them to the region
f low downtime and low frequency. The objective is to improve
he performance of the machines so that they move to the low
requency and low downtime cell of the DMG. Fig. (8) shows the
MG as proposed by Labib (1998) . 
The machines that are classed in the cell for high frequency and
igh downtime are considered to be the worst performing ones.
o, to ensure the improvement in performance for such machines
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Fig. 6. A full HoQ Matrix ( Hauser & Clausing, 1988 ). 
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n design out maintenance strategy is used. For machines that are
lassed in the low frequency high downtime cell, the rightful strat-
gy to implement is the condition-based maintenance. 
If a machine is put in the low downtime and high frequency,
he rule that applies is autonomous maintenance or Skill Level Up-
rade (SLU). This implies that operators are trained to perform the
aintenance associated with such machine, as the tasks are rela-
ively easy. Whereas, if a machine is put in the low frequency and
igh downtime, the rule that applies is Condition-Based Mainte-
ance (CBM). This implies that there is need to monitor condition
f a major type of problem that seldom occurs. As for the ones al-
ocated to a low frequency and low downtime cell, an ‘Operate To
ailure - OTF’ strategy has to be implemented. For the remaining
ells of the DMG, the usage of the Total Preventive Maintenance
TPM) strategy needs to be continued. Finally a high frequency,
igh downtime implies a Design Out Maintenance (DOM) strategy
ince the whole machine needs to be reconﬁgured. 
Traditionally, the DMG model that compares frequency and
owntime have been used in helping decision makers and policyevelopers in selecting the rightful maintenance strategies for their
ritical assets. This technique has recently been extended to help
n learning from failures. Aslam-Zainudeen and Labib (2011) stated
hat the technique has also been used in crisis management. 
In this paper we modify the DMG to use it in ensuring that all
he causal factors of a failure are solved and preventive measures
re put in place as to avoid them to aid in the formulation of an-
ther failure in the future. From the AHP developed in the earlier
ection we obtain information on which two alternatives we need
o pay attention to in order to ensure that the basic events don’t
esult in another failure in the future. 
The two alternatives that received higher rankings in the AHP
odels provided earlier are the safety impact of the basic events
nd the Probability of re-occurrence. As such we are going to de-
elop a DMG with increasing safety impact on the x-axis and the
robability of re-occurrence in the y-axis. Each axis would then be
ivided into three levels (low, medium and High) to form a grid of
ine sections as shown in Fig. (9) . 
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Fig. 7. The simpliﬁed HoQ matrix. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9. The modiﬁed DMG model. 
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a  Therefore, in order to summarise how in Fig. (9) , the results of
previous methods can feed into this grid, we do this in two ways,
one is to determine the new set of axes used (compare original
grid in Fig. (8) to the modiﬁed one in Fig. (9) ). The second way is
through plotting the different basic events from Fig. (2) and their
ranking with respect to the two axes as shown in Figs. (4 and 5 )
into the grid. As for how the borders have been set, this judgement
is based in the variation in the values, but can also be formalised
using different methods. For more details about different methods
to set the borders in DMG, please see Seecharan, Labib, and Jar-
dine (2018) . 
Using personal judgement each basic event is allocated to the
most appropriate cell of the grid. Each of these cells indicates the
priority that should be given to the allocated event. For example
the basic event that is allocated to the high safety impact highFig. 8. DMG ( Labrobability of re-occurrence cell must be given higher priority as
ompared to the events in other cells. 
The objective of this DMG is to ensure that preventive mea-
ures for the basic events that are in the High-high cell in the
atrix are put in place so that they move to the cells that are
f lower safety impact and lower probability of re-occurrence as
ompared to their initial allocated cell. The order of ensuring that
ll basic events are tackled is to start with event allocated to the
igh safety impact high probability of re-occurrence (high-high)
ell then high-medium, medium-high, medium-medium, high-low,
ow-high, low-medium and low-low respectively. 
As the output of the proposed model each basic event that re-
ulted in the occurrence of the incident under study are prioritized
nd preventive measure put in place to ensure that their inﬂuencesib, 1998 ). 
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I  ven on the future are eliminated. These priorities indicates the
evel of response, at which the solutions need to be implemented,
s such could be compared to the maintenance strategies proposed
n the original DMG model by Labib (1998) . 
In the proposed model, DOM has the same meaning as ‘imme-
iate response’. This means that event 3 and 4 would require being
esolved immediately. The level of response required in resolving
he causal factors reduces with the decrease in either the safety
mpact or the probability of re-occurrence, with the factors located
n OTF cell being the last one to resolve. Event 7 is solved before
vent 6 because from the AHP model for indirect causes the rating
or Probability for reoccurrence is higher than that of safety impact
nd this is the opposite for direct causal factors. 
The strengths of this feature of the proposed model is that all
he causal factors to the failure are taken and put in one place
nd solutions developed one at a time ensuring that the ones that
re of high safety impact and have high chance of re-occurring if
eft unattended are given attention ﬁrst before dealing with the
emaining ones. This helps to ensure that no causal factors to a
ailure are left hidden in the system an issue that can spark a re-
ccurrence in the future. 
The weakness of this feature is that basic events that lie in the
ame cell of the grid but at different extremes are treated the same
ence in actual facts they have different states. The example being
vent 3 and 4. As a solution to this weakness, the proposed model
tilises the HoQ matrix that feeds information on relative impor-
ance of events to the simpliﬁed DMG hence priorities. As such, we
an tell that event 4 have to be given higher priority than event 3
ven though the two are in the same cell of the DMG. This can also
e solved by the application of fuzzy logic as proposed by Aslam-
ainudeen and Labib (2011) . 
. Conclusions 
The proposed hybrid model is an extension of the model by
abib and Read (2015) . The ZS-CME serious incident has been in-
estigated using the proposed model which showed that the causal
actors number 3 and 4 should be given high priority when devis-
ng preventive measures as they fall in the high safety Impact and
igh probability of re-occurrence cell in the modiﬁed DMG. The re-
ults from the HoQ indicates that even though event 3 and 4 are
iven the same priority in the DMG event 4 should be given the
tmost priority as it has a high value of relative importance. 
For Indirect causes, the modiﬁed DMG shows that event 7
eeds more priority as compared to event 6 because it falls un-
er the high probability of re-occurrence region as compared to
igh safety Impact region. This is so because the AHP model for
ndirect causes of the failure have awarded a high weight to prob-
bility of re-occurrence rather than safety impact, as it is the case
ith direct causes. 
The novelty of the proposed model came from the fact that HoQ
nd DMG are used to show the priorities that need to be given
o each of the causal factors of the failure and comparing their
esults. This comparison cancels out the weakness of the DMG
hat is associated with events in the same cell but on the op-
osite extremes hence eliminating the need for fuzzy logic. The
ther strength that is associated with the proposed model is that
t leaves no stone unturned in the event of a failure as was seen by
aking consideration of both the direct and indirect causal factors
f the failure. 
The weakness of the proposed model comes with too much de-
endency on personal judgement. This does not only bring bias to
he failure investigation but also inconsistencies. The authors be-
ieve that the inconsistencies and bias can be eliminated by the
se of a group of people in situations where personal judgements
re required hence resulting in the use of collective judgement ofhe group. However, group decision making has its own assump-
ions and challenges which are beyond the scope of this paper. For
xample, individual decision makers in the group can be either as-
umed to be equally weighted, or a method needs to be derived to
llocate weights to each decision maker ( Chakhar, Ishizaka, Labib,
 Saad, 2016; Ishizaka & Labib, 2011b ). In addition, there is a chal-
enge in ﬁnding a suitable group that can represent all the stake-
olders in the decision making process ( Poplawska, Labib, Reed, &
shizaka, 2015 ). 
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ppendix A 
In order to brieﬂy describe the traditional AHP eigenvalue
ethod , we start from the case of a consistent matrix with known
riorities p i . 
If the matrix is perfectly consistent, the transitivity rule
1) holds for all comparisons a ij : 
 i j = a ik · a k j (1) 
In this case, the comparisons of the alternative i and j is given
y p i / p j . If, we multiply it with the priority vector  p, we obtain: 
p 1 / p 1 p 1 / p 2 … p 1 / p n 
p 2 / p 1 p 2 / p 2 … p 2 / p n 
… … … …
p n / p 1 p n / p 2 … p n / p n 
 
 
 
p 1 
p 2 
... 
p n 
⎤ 
⎥ ⎦ = n 
⎡ 
⎢ ⎣ 
p 1 
p 2 
... 
p n 
⎤ 
⎥ ⎦ 
r grouped: 
 

 p = n  p
here  p: vector of the priorities 
n : dimension of the matrix 
A : comparison matrix 
(2) 
Eq. (2) is the formulation of an eigenvector problem. The cal-
ulated priorities are exact for a consistent matrix. When slight
nconsistencies are introduced, priorities should vary only slightly
ccording to the perturbation theory ( Saaty, 2003 ). 
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